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RECONNAISSANCE REPORT OF THE MAY 28, 2009
HONDURAS EARTHQUAKE, M 7.3
Ronaldo Luna
Associate Professor
Missouri University of Science and Technology
Department of Civil, Environmental and Architectural Engineering
130 Butler-Carlton Hall
1401 N. Pine St.
Rolla, MO 65409
rluna@mst.edu

A team sponsored by the Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and the Geoengineering Extreme Event
Reconnaissance (GEER) Association carried out a field investigation in conjunction with Honduran colleagues from June 18-23
to document effects of the May 28 earthquake. The EERI-GEER team was invited by Mr. Marco Sandoval, Executive Director of
the Comisión Ejecutiva Valle de Sula (CEVS). Mr. Sandoval sent a team of engineers to accompany the EERI-GEER team. The
team included experts in structural, geotechnical engineering, as well as in disaster response and recovery. The investigators
were supported by EERI: Abdeldjelil Belarbi and GEER: Ronaldo Luna and Kermit Applegate, all from Missouri S&T, Rolla.
The CEVS team consisted of Humberto Calderon, Osvaldo Rivera, and Luis Alonso Lopez. Observations of other individuals
who visited the earthquake-affected region have also been incorporated in this report. This material is based upon work
supported by the National Science Foundation through the GeoEnvironmental Engineering and GeoHazards Mitigation
Program under Grant No. CMMI-0825734. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this
material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF. The GEER Association is made possible by
the vision and support of the NSF Geoenvironmental Engineering and GeoHazards Mitigation Program Directors: Dr. Richard
Fragaszy and the late Dr. Cliff Astill. GEER members also donate their time, talent, and resources to collect time-sensitive field
observations of the effects of earthquakes. The EERI efforts were supported through the Learning From Earthquakes (LFE)
program which is also funded by the National Science Foundation.

INTRODUCTION
An earthquake of magnitude M 7.3 struck the Atlantic coast of Honduras on May 28, 2009. The epicenter was located 63 km
north of Roatán (Bahía Islands) and 125 km NNE of La Ceiba. This has been the strongest earthquake felt in Honduras in the
past 3 decades. The earthquake event and aftershocks were felt in Honduras, Belize, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.
Several smaller events followed the main event, such as the June 8th and 15th events with magnitudes 5.4 and 4.8, respectively.
The earthquake event was of significant magnitude and with limited consequences. At least 7 people were killed and 40 injured
with damage to more than 150 buildings. Some of the country’s major infrastructure, such as port terminals, bridges and levees
were seriously damaged. The following sections address the seismological setting, geotechnical and structural aspects and the
socio-economic impact. Several GoogleEarth .kmz files complement this report, which contain GPS tracks, waypoints, and
additional photographs for every day of the reconnaissance effort. They can be accessed at the following website:
http://www.geerassociation.org/Post_EQ_Reports.html.
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TECTONIC SETTING AND SEISMOLOGICAL
RECORDS

Caribbean plates. It has been estimated that in this region
the plate boundary has a 20 mm/yr slip. (USGS, 2009)

According to the USGS interpretation of the seismological
data the location and focal mechanism of the Honduras
earthquake of May 28, 2009, imply that the shock occurred
as the result of left-lateral strike-slip faulting. This event
was located on the Swan Islands Transform Fault, a
segment of the boundary between the North America and

The North America/Caribbean plate boundary has
generated strong earthquakes before, thirty three years ago
the 1976 Guatemala earthquake, M 7.5, produced more
than 23,000 fatalities. The 1976 earthquake occurred on
the Motagua fault, a segment of the plate boundary that lies
about 400 kilometers southwest of the 2009 Honduras
offshore hypocenter.

Figure 1 – Tectonic Setting (USGS, 2009)
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Figure 2 – Epicentral Region (USGS, 2009)

The seismological records in Honduras are scarce. A
recent station was installed by the USGS in Tegucigalpa,
the capital city. The record from this station is more than
310 km away from the epicenter. Another seismograph
has been in operation for some time now at the El Cajon
dam site about 260 km away from the epicenter. Both
seismograph instruments recorded data and preliminary
review indicates low quality records. The few stations that
have been installed are monitored and supported by the
INETER from Nicaragua.
Additionally, three
accelerographs are also installed at the dam at the base and
other two within the concrete structure, the records were
obtained from Rolando Rodriguez, dam safety engineer.

Chamalecon Rivers. Damage was selective of those
structures that were supported on soft foundation soils
and/or supported on filled or reclaimed land. This was
evident at sites located in San Pedro Sula and Puerto
Cortés. The most obvious example of local site effects was
at the Supreme Court Building located on the Segunda
Circunvalación Road in San Pedro Sula. The Supreme
Court building is a three story reinforced concrete frame
which underwent structural damage (see Figure 11). The
building is supported on about 3 m of fill underlain by soft
and compressible organic soils. In contrast to this
structure, a multi-story reinforced concrete stadium located
less than half a mile away did not experience this level of
damage.

GEOTECHNICAL ASPECTS
Liquefaction
Local Site Effects
The seismic event produced strong ground motion
throughout the region, but its effects were amplified
primarily within the alluvium valley of the Ulua and
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Liquefaction was widespread in areas underlined by
granular saturated sediments. Sand boils, surface cracks,
and lateral spreads were evident in many areas near Puerto
Cortes and towards the town of Omoa on the Caribbean
Sea coast. The structures impacted by the widespread
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liquefaction were petrochemical terminals, ports, wharfs,
roadway embankments and other smaller buildings.
Of particular interest was the damage encountered at the
Chevron Terminal in Puerto Cortés. This area was built on
sandy fill. Liquefaction sand boils were wide spread
throughout the terminal within tanks, pipe racks and small
buildings (see Figure 3). Damage to tanks was not evident,

except a pressurized vessel that settled more than 2 ft on
one side tilting the entire tank, which was supported on
shallow foundations (see Figure 4). Small structures
supported on shallow foundations were damaged, such as
the laboratory and office buildings (see Figure 5). Safety
inspection requirements and repairs of tanks and pipeline
systems will take more time.

(c)

(b)

(a)

Figure 3 – Chevron Terminal remains closed as of 06/28/2009.
(a) Note inundation due to wide spread liquefaction [05/28/2009 N15.848287, W87.958041],
(b) Same entrance location 3-weeks later [06/20/2009 12:40PM, N15.848287, W87.958041], and
(c) Multiple pipeline deformation and breaks [06/20/2009 1:24PM, N15.849177, W87.959274]

(a)

(b)

Figure 4 – (a) Tanks supported on shallow foundations sank and tilted, notice sand boil piled up next to foundation on left
[6/20/2009, 1:12PM, 15.851061, -87.956882], and (b) those supported on piles performed well [06/20/2009, 1:16 PM,
N15.851226, W87.958534].

(a)

(b)

Figure 5 – (a) Buildings and small structures sank up to 3 ft and were flooded with liquefied sand [06/20/2009, 1:08 PM,
N15.849851, W87.95793], and (b) vehicles sank into sand boils, see carport automobile was already extracted [06/20/2009, 1:25
PM, N15.848216, W87.958604].
Paper No. EQ 6
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Other buildings and residences were damaged in the
central zone of Puerto Cortés due to the wide spread
liquefaction and ejected sand. Buildings tilted and became
inundated, leaving much sand behind. The surface storm
sewer system was clogged for weeks until the municipality

and neighbors were able to excavate the drains. A recently
build roadway embankment that contains a major utility on
the south side of the city was seriously affected by lateral
spreading. (Figure6)

Figure 6 – Temporary repair of roadway embankment, due to lateral spreading
[06/20/2009, 1:25 PM, N15.848216, W87.958604].

Port Facilities
Earthquake damage at the most important port in Honduras
was localized even though it remains in operation. Most of the
damage was concerning movement of slabs and wharfs causing
joints to move in the vertical and horizontal directions. In
some cases the slabs collapsed due to the loss of subgrade
support (Fig 7a and 7b). It was reported that some of the pile

supported wharfs moved upwards by several inches. Some
foundations appeared to have moved upward, but this
differential movement is all relative to the surrounding ground
subsidence, which needs to be confirmed by precision survey
(Fig. 7c). Fuel tanks supported on concrete mats experienced
large deformations due to widespread liquefaction and surface
rupture of fill materials, see Figure 7(d).

(c)

(b)

(a)

(a) Up to 0.46m at the main dock [06/20/2009, 3:37PM, N15.843718, W87.951739],
(b) 0.2m near port warehouses [06/20/2009, 3:49PM, N15.8424, W87.94941], and
(c) Relative foundation displacement up to 0.15m [06/20/2009, 4:00PM, N15.841912, W87.941644].
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(d)
(d) Three view of fuel tanks and multiple ground fissures due to wide spread liquefaction
[06/20/2009, 3:12PM, N15.846936, W87.963225]
Figure 7 – Liquefaction induced deformations at Puerto Cortés – Slabs on grade and Tanks.

Levees
The valley of the Ulúa and Chamalecón rivers (Valle de
Sula), runs north towards the Caribbean Sea. A system of
levees protects the agricultural activities, urban and
residential areas. A preliminary survey completed by the
Comisión Ejecutiva Valle de Sula (CEVS) identified 58
km of levee damage due to the earthquake event. Lateral
spreading was observed along the banks of the Ulúa River.

(a)

(b)

On the edge of a sugar cane plantation, about 250 meters
from the river edge, long fissures opened in the direction
parallel to the river (Figure 8). The crack openings ranged
from 10 to 50cm with a depth of about one meter.
Allochthonous sand ejecta ware present along the length of
the fissures, and sand boils were scattered amongst the
sugar cane plantations.

(c)

Figure 8 – (a) Longitudinal cracks along roadways [06/22/2009, 10:03AM, N15.368726, W87.861301], (b) with sand at surface
[06/22/2009, 10:10AM, N15.369316, W87.860965],
(c) sandboils within plantations [06/22/2009, 10:06AM, N15.368988, W87.861209].
Near the edge of the Ulua River, on the unprotected zone
of the levee system, extreme lateral spreading was evident.
Gaping fissures up to 5 meters wide and two meters deep
have indelibly altered the landscape (Figure 9). This will
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have serious consequences as the rainy season approaches
and the levee system is not able to keep the flood water out
of the protected zones (plantations and rural residences).
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Figure 9 – Multiple views of severe lateral spreading between levees and river
[06/22/2009, 10:25AM, N15.391266, W87.845191].
Along the crest of the levee system, a network of smaller
cracks (about 5-10cm wide and several meters deep) has
rendered nearly 60 km of the levee system ineffective

(Figure 10). CEVS is currently undergoing an emergency
earthwork operation to reinstate levee geometries to its preearthquake conditions.

Figure 10 – Cracks at the crest of levees exceeding 1.5m deep
[06/22/2009, 11:57AM, N15.344505, W87.868515].

STRUCTURAL ASPECTS

Buildings
The Supreme Court building, located on the Segunda
Circunvalación Road in San Pedro Sula, is a three story
reinforced concrete frame which underwent structural
damage. Each story is about 4 m high with columns and
beams with the same (350 mm x 350 mm) cross-section.
The building had frames with concrete beams running in
orthogonal directions. The concrete frames were in-filled
with brick masonry. Typical failures of these in-filled
masonry walls are shown in Figure 11.
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Inside the building and some locations, these frames were
partially filled with masonry walls. This in turn causes the
reduction in height of the column resulting in increased
lateral shear during earthquakes. This is also called as short
column effect. This failure mode, also called captivecolumn or captured-column, is very common in RC frames
with infill walls. This failure happens when an infill wall is
extended into a frame from the floor level up to another
level to form a window, leaving a short free space in the
top portion. The column in such a structure is partially
restricted by the wall. This shortened column develops
large shear force which may exceed the shear capacity of
the column, resulting in failure. The problem is well
known but is often ignored in practice. In some cases, the
infill walls are separated from the column to allow flexure
7

of columns. But insufficient gaps produced the same
consequences. Figure 11b shows a reinforced column
failed by shear. The column is constrained by masonry
infill walls in perpendicular direction. Shear cracks were
developed from masonry wall which led to shear failure of
columns. Figure 11c shows the failure due to short column
effect from a masonry infill wall. These columns had No. 3
ties spaced at 6 to 8 inches. This seems to be an
inadequate detailing for seismic loading. The large spacing
of lateral ties did not provide the required confinement to
the core concrete.

Infill walls, usually located between RC columns and
beams, can suffer out-of-plane overturn due to inertial
forces during an earthquake. Because infill walls are nonload-bearing elements, they tend to be thin and cannot rely
on the additional shear strength that accompanies vertical
compressive loads. If infill walls are not properly
restrained in out-of-plane direction, walls can collapse
during strong ground shaking, producing damages to
inhabitants and properties. If walls on the façade of a
structure collapse, the consequences could be deadly to
pedestrians. Figure 11a shows a typical in-fill wall failure.

(a) Overall damage including out-of-plane failure of masonry infill wall
[06/19/2009, 5:53PM, N15.472899, W88.018565].

Unsupported
height

(b) Column failure at the infill wall frame interface
[06/19/2009, 5:08PM, N15.473038, W88.018103]

(c) short column effect failure
[06/19/2009, 5:31PM, N15.473346, W88.018592]

Figure 11 – Supreme Court Bldg. structural damage due to local site effects and aseismic design.
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Bridges
Two bridges suffered serious consequences by the seismic
events of May 28th, 2009. The reinforced concrete 3-arch
bridge, entitled “La Democracia”, crosses the Ulua River
near the town of El Progreso. The bridge connects this
town to the major city of San Pedro Sula in northern
Honduras. The bridge that experience collapse of the
middle span was built in 1965 by a team of French
engineers. The structure consists of two middle supports
with nearly symmetric monolithic arches, with the middle
span complemented by a straight beam span. The total
length of the bridge was 258 m. The middle span was 36
m. These middle components consist of four simply

supported T-beams. All supports, including abutments,
consist of steel plate bearings. Figure 12 shows the
collapsed middle span and in the background the newer
2005 twin bridge built by the Japanese, which still is in
service taking the traffic towards el Progreso. The
bearings on the abutments moved more than 250 mm in the
horizontal direction. This bridge had shear key only in the
longitudinal direction to support the T-beams. This simply
supported girder Type Bridge had inadequate seating and
no provisions like lateral restraint to prevent unseating.
The lack of redundancy in the simply supported beam also
prevented formation of alternate load path which resulted
in the fall of the beams and consequently the middle span.

30 cm
Overall
Depth =
90 cm

35 cm

(a)
Top view

(b)

Cracks

(c)
Figure 12 – La Democracia twin-bridge with middle span collapsed.
(a) Top view of shear key [06/19/2009, 6:45PM, N15.404139, W87.820174.],
(b) Overall view of the twin bridge [06/19/2009, 6:45PM, N15.40478, W87.819967], and
(c) cracking due to lateral restraint in the new bridge [06/19/2009, 6:58PM, N15.40408, W87.820615].

In contrast, the new bridge, which consists of a single
monolithic concrete arched structure, has neoprene
elastomeric bearings and shear keys at the supports. The
shear keys suffered diagonal cracks, evidence that they
engaged in keeping the bridge on its bearings during the
seismic event. A transverse crack on the bridge (western
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bank) was identified.
Liquefaction sand boils and
significant settlement of the banks and possible lateral
spreading was evident on the river banks. In some
locations cracks and settlement exceeding 250 mm was
observed (See Figure 13).
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(b)

(a)

Figure 13 – Settlement of ground around abutments due to liquefaction
(a) Old bridge westbound [06/19/2009, 6:36PM, N15.404409, W87.821095], and
(b) New bridge, eastbound [06/19/2009, 6:52PM, N15.40422, W87.821021].

The other bridge that suffered damage during the seismic
event was the bridge near Santa Rita over the Humuya
River (Figure 14). The foundation support was already
weakened due to scour, which historically has damaged the
bridge and scour continues to aggravate the situation. The
most common cause of bridge failure is structural
instability and undermining caused by movement of
column bent exaggerated by excessive scouring. Scour is
the result of the erosive action of flowing water, excavating
and carrying away material from the bed and banks of
streams, and from around the piers and abutments of
bridges.
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This two-lane bridge consists of 8 spans of 5 simply
supported reinforced concrete girders (1m x 0.6m x 30m)
built in the 1970s. Two supports experienced significant
movement and the third column bent was tilted and rotated
causing settlement and a reduction in the bearing support
of the girders The fourth span had only about 5 to 6 cm of
bearing on the third column bent as shown in Figure 14.
The night of June 28th several spans collapsed as shown in
Figure 15.
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Bent movement
direction

(a)
(b)

(c)
Figure 14 – Santa Rita Bridge over the Humuya River after the earthquake and before collapse
(a) [06/21/2009, 6:08PM, N15.191548, W87.82559],
(b) [06/21/2009, 5:43PM, N15.191017, W87.8922393],
(c) [06/21/2009, 5:40PM, N15.190907, W87.892658]

Figure 15 – Collapse of the 2 to 3 spans of the Sta. Rita Bridge over the Humuya River post-earthquake
[06/28/2009, N15.191019, W87.892095] (source: LaPrensa.hn).
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El Cajon Dam
A visit by the recon team was made on June 21st consisting in
meeting with the director of dam safety at the dam site and
external and internal visit of this concrete arch dam. The
dam is 227 m high arched dam and it forms a reservoir
94km2. This dam is the most significant civil infrastructure
in northern Honduras and continued normal operations
during and after the event. However, the response of the dam
to the earthquake was successfully recorded by the
instrumentation monitoring system at the site, including one
seismograph and three accelerographs. After the event a
visual inspection was made by the safety inspection squad
and was followed by a more detailed data collection survey
of the installed instrumentation. The following is a summary
of the measurements and observations made immediately
after the earthquake event.
Accelerographs: Historic values were reached during the
event. At the top of the dam (El. 291m) the Dam registered
its maximum value of -0.081g was recorded. At the bottom
of the dam (El. 78m) the maximum acceleration was
recorded as 0.010g. The maximum value obtained before
this event was of -0.045g on July 11, 1999.

(a)

Seismograph: During the following 13 hours after the main
event, 23 events were registered in the seismograph, which is
located on rock below the safety engineering station on the
west abutment. The seismograph data was delivered to
INETER in Nicaragua for interpretation.
Pendulums: There are 21 pendulums which measure the
deformation of the dam. The readings of these instruments
are not outside the normal parameters because there was not
a deformation in the dam. Evidently, during the event the
alarm went off because the dam moved.
Extensometers: These instruments measure the deformation
of the rock in the base of the dam. The readings from these
devices are between the same parameters as before the event,
so there is no value outside the boundaries.
Filtration Flow and Drainage: The increments in the flow
are not significant. The change in flow after the event was
noteworthy, from about 138 lt./sec. to 167 lt./sec. Turbidity
was detected in the downstream outflows shortly after the
event (3 days), but none was observed during our visit. This
is evidence of adjustments within the rock and soil that may
promote continued filtration through the curtain.

(b)

Figure 16 – (a) Weir passing turbid water at base of dam [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885], and
(b) reflected in downstream river [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885].

Pore pressures: In general the behavior of the impermeable
curtain was not significantly impacted. However, four
piezometric instruments in the G78 gallery present
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increments equivalent to about 16 to 19 m of pressure head.
This coincides with the location of the “Fault III” within the
dam site, suggesting movement during the event.
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(b)

(a)

Figure 17 – (a) Turbid seepage at base of dam [05/28/2009, N15.03096, W87.747885], and
(b) clear seepage at base of dam [06/21/2009, 11.55AM, 15.03096, -87.747885]

Powerhouse: There are no seepage increments in the
filtration paths of the north well and GL11 spring (old
access), but the water is showed high turbidity. At a joint of
the access tunnel I17 similar situation was observed with
higher temperatures reaching 34.6C.
Even though the dam safety instrumentation measured the
impact of the earthquake event on the dam, the structure is
considered safe and continues to operate normally. The dam
safety plan did not require any further action, as none of the
thresholds were reached.
However, a grouting plan
programmed for the near future to seal the existing grout
curtain is currently being re-assessed.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT
Several major civil infrastructures in the north of Honduras
along the Valle de Sula (Petrochemical Terminals, Bridges,
and Levees) were crippled by the earthquake events of May
28th, 2009 and will have a lasting impact on the socioeconomic recovery. The Chevron Terminal at Puerto Cortés
has been closed for more than a month due to safety
concerns, most tanks have been emptied and gasoline
distributed on trucks. This terminal supplies about 40% of
the gasoline to the country and in some service stations
gasoline is becoming scarce. The 60km of damage levees
due to large longitudinal cracks and lateral spreading are
currently being repaired by the CEVS corps of engineers.
However, these weakened earth structures will remain
vulnerable to flood events during hurricane season which
starts in September. Other building damage, primarily
residential and small commercial, was also observed
throughout the region and was not the focus of this
investigation. The officials at the local municipality in
Puerto Cortés, in conjunction with COPECO, conducted a
detailed damage assessment survey and identified more than
a thousand damaged residences.
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